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A B S T R A C T 
In On Certainty, Wittgenstein formulates 
several criticisms against skepticism about 
our knowledge of the external world. My 
goal is to show that Wittgenstein does not 
here offer a convincing answer to the skepti-
cal problem. First, I will present a strong 
version of the problem, understanding it as 
a paradoxical argument. In the second part, 
I will introduce and raise problems for two 
pragmatic responses against skepticism that 
appear in On Certainty. Finally, I will pre-
sent some of Wittgenstein’s logical criti-
cisms against skepticism, which may initially 
be considered strong, because they seem to 
refute some skeptical assumptions. They 
concern Wittgenstein’s ideas that it is logi-
cally impossible to doubt and to be mistaken 
about Moorean propositions, and that these 
propositions don’t have a truth-value. But 
even these, I intend to show, do not really 
challenge skepticism, for they are not well 
grounded. 
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R E S U M O 
Em Da certeza, Wittgenstein formula várias 
críticas contra o ceticismo em relação ao 
nosso conhecimento do mundo externo. 
Meu objetivo é mostrar que Wittgenstein 
não oferece aqui uma resposta convincente 
ao problema cético. Em primeiro lugar, apre-
sentarei uma versão forte do problema, en-
tendendo-o como um argumento paradoxal. 
Na segunda parte, vou introduzir e levantar 
problemas para duas respostas pragmáticas 
contra o ceticismo que aparecem em Da cer-
teza. Finalmente, apresentarei algumas das 
críticas lógicas de Wittgenstein contra o ceti-
cismo, que inicialmente podem ser conside-
radas fortes, porque parecem refutar alguns 
pressupostos céticos. Elas dizem respeito às 
idéias de Wittgenstein de que é logicamente 
impossível duvidar e confundir-se com as 
proposições mooreanas, e que essas proposi-
ções não têm valor verdadeiro. Pretendo 
mostrar, entretanto, que elas tampouco de-
safiam realmente o ceticismo, pois não estão 
bem fundamentadas. 
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In notes published posthumously as On Certainty (OC), Wittgenstein formulates 
several criticisms against skepticism about our knowledge of the existence of the 
external world. Commentators sometimes disagree as to how to describe Wittgen-
stein’s way out of skepticism, whether he refutes, dissolves, or demystifies skepti-
cism, or even shows it to be aberrant.1 In any case, it seems that the prevailing idea 
among commentators is that Wittgenstein offers a way out of the skeptical problem, 
or at least a good way to deal with it. But what one normally finds in the scholarship 
is an attempt to show how Wittgenstein attacks skepticism, without considering the 
skeptical point of view separately and properly.2 The most common consequence 
of this attitude is to declare Wittgenstein’s victory against an opponent that has not 
been properly represented. 
My goal here is to show that, contrary to what many seem to think, Wittgenstein 
does not offer a good way out of the skeptical problem of our knowledge of the 
external world in On Certainty. I’m not going to try to assess the claim that Witt-
genstein dissolves or demystifies skepticism, because these notions have not been 
clearly set out. Instead, I want to investigate whether Wittgenstein can be said to 
have a strong response to a strongly constructed skeptical argument. In order to do 
that, I will first present a strong version of the skeptical problem. I will understand 
it as a paradoxical argument, which proposes an intellectual challenge. With this 
characterization of the problem in mind, I will try to show that some observations 
against skepticism in On Certainty are clearly weak, but others can, in a way, be 
considered strong. I take it that we can read several kinds of responses against skep-
ticism in On Certainty. In this paper I’m going to focus on two broad types of re-
sponse that are normally not dealt with by the commentators. In the second part of 
this paper, I will introduce and raise problems for two responses that I consider 
weak, one that says that skeptical doubt is absent from everyday life and another 
that says that it is practically impossible to doubt Moorean propositions. I will argue 
that these responses do not attack anything presupposed by the skeptical problem 
                                                   
1 Moyal-Sharrock, for instance, says that “Wittgenstein’s epistemological recategorization also resulted in the 
more generally recognized achievement of the third Wittgenstein: his demystification of skepticism” (Moyal-
Sharrock, 2004a, p. 3). Elsewhere, she says: “this is precisely what Wittgenstein does in On Certainty: he 
dissolves the problem of doubt-scepticism” (Moyal-Sharrock, 2004b, p. 163). According to Stroll, “to have 
diagnosed why scepticism is not merely false but aberrant is one of Wittgenstein’s greatest achievements” 
(Stroll, 2005, p. 45). 
2 This kind of approach can be found, for example, in Moyal-Sharrock (2004a and 2004b) and Stroll (1994 and 
2005). Exceptions are Wright (1986 and 1991) and Pritchard (2005). Wright formulates the skeptical problem 
in a strong manner and takes Wittgenstein to be going in the right direction against it. But his goal is not 
purely exegetical; rather, he uses some of the ideas present in On Certainty to offer his own elaborated response 
to the skeptical argument. Pritchard (2005) also portrays skepticism in a strong way, but he thinks that what 
he calls an epistemic reading of On Certainty, such as the one he believes Wright offers, cannot give an appro-
priate response to the strong skeptical problem; it gives at most, according to him, a pragmatic response. He 
leaves open, however, the possibility that a semantic reading would offer a better response. The type of response 
against skepticism that I think is the most promising is neither epistemic nor semantic, but (in Wittgenstein’s 
peculiar sense) logical. But I’ll try to show, in the final section of the paper, that even Wittgenstein’s supposedly 
logical observations against skepticism are not effective against a strong version of skepticism. 
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portrayed in the first section. In the third and last part of the paper, I will introduce 
other criticisms against skepticism that may initially be considered strong, because 
they seem to deny some skeptical assumptions. They concern Wittgenstein’s ideas 
that it is logically impossible to doubt and to be mistaken about Moorean proposi-
tions, and that Moorean propositions don’t have a truth-value. The latter observa-
tion is very frequently ignored by commentators. But even these, I intend to show, 
do not refute skepticism.3 
1. How to understand skepticism 
To assess whether or not Wittgenstein successfully attacks skepticism, we must have 
an idea of the problem to be faced. What really matters is whether his criticisms are 
sufficient to undermine a strong version of the problem. It has become common in 
recent years to conceive the skeptical problem of the external world as an argument 
that poses an intellectual challenge, in particular, one that has a paradoxical charac-
ter, because although its premises seem reasonable, its conclusion is unacceptable. 
This is the characterization I will adopt here. This version does not appeal to com-
monly made and easily refutable assumptions about skepticism, such as that accept-
ing it requires doubting everything and changing our practices. What interests me, 
then, is to evaluate whether Wittgenstein’s observations are strong enough to un-
dermine this sort of argument4: 
(1) If I know I have hands, then I know that there is not an evil genius. 
(2) I do not know that there is not an evil genius. 
 So, by modus tollens, 
(3) I do not know that I have hands. 
 “I have hands” is just one example of a proposition whose truth depends on the 
existence of the external world, and could be replaced by any other proposition 
about the external world that seems absolutely certain, such as “I live on planet 
                                                   
3 One common interpretation of some remarks in On Certainty is that Wittgenstein denies the meaningfulness 
of the skeptical argument. So the skeptic assumes it makes sense to take skeptical hypotheses as possible 
falsifiers of everyday propositions, and also that it makes sense to claim not to know those propositions. 
Wittgenstein, on the contrary, in the spirit of his “meaning is use” motto, would be saying that the skeptical 
argument is meaningless because there is no context of use for it. There is no context in which people take 
skeptical hypotheses into consideration, nor contexts in which they claim not to know ordinary propositions. 
I think there are passages in On Certainty where Wittgenstein seems to be taking this kind of approach, but 
I’m not going to deal with it here, first because it would make this paper much longer, but also because I 
don’t think it is an anti-skeptical strategy worth pursuing. Suffice to say that this reason for considering the 
skeptical argument meaningless is highly questionable, because it presupposes a clear distinction between 
ordinary and philosophical uses of language, and a preference for the first. Since there are contexts of philo-
sophical discussion in which the skeptical argument is taken seriously and considered meaningful, it could 
be asked what grounds the decision to take ordinary contexts as the standard for meaningfulness. And it 
cannot be said that it is a purely descriptive stance that shows that, as some Wittgensteinians would like to 
say, for a purely descriptive stance should include in the description the philosophical use of language. 
4 The skeptical argument has been similarly formulated in a number of places, such as Wright (1991), Pritchard 
(2005) and Nozick (1981). 
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Earth” or “I have a human body”. I will call propositions of this type Moorean 
proposition, in reference to Moore’s “A Defence of Common Sense”. Here Moore 
lists a series of truisms such as these, which he claims to know with absolute cer-
tainty. The skeptical argument could also be formulated by means of other usual 
skeptical hypotheses, such as the dream hypothesis or the hypothesis that I am a 
brain in a vat receiving stimuli from a neuroscientist. The evil genius, as imagined 
by Descartes, would have the power to make me believe in everything that is false. 
Any of these hypotheses could function as part of the premises of the skeptical ar-
gument, whose conclusion is intended to show that we do not know most of what 
we ordinarily take ourselves to know. 
An interesting aspect of the skeptical argument is that, in order for its conclusion 
to be true, no skeptical hypothesis needs to be true. What the first premise of the 
argument says is that to know Moorean propositions, I need to know that the skep-
tical hypotheses are false, because the truth of any skeptical hypothesis is incompat-
ible with my knowledge of Moorean propositions. For, as long as I do not know that 
there is not an evil genius, even if it does not exist, the epistemic status of my beliefs 
will be affected. That is, in order for me to know that I have hands, for example, it 
is not enough that the hypothesis of the evil genius is false and that my belief is true. 
If I recognize that the existence of an evil genius would make my belief false, then, 
in order for me to know that I have hands, I must know that there is not an evil 
genius. If I do not know that I am not being deceived by an evil genius, then I do 
not know whether my belief in the existence of my hands is true. If this possibility 
remains open, even if in fact there is not an evil genius, I will not have knowledge 
that I have hands, although I may still have a true belief. As Stroud says, “as soon as 
we see that a certain possibility is incompatible with our knowing such-and-such, it 
is suggested, we immediately recognize that it is a possibility that must be known 
not to obtain if we are to know the such-and-such in question” (Stroud, 1984, p. 27). 
So, for me to know that I have hands it is not sufficient, although it is necessary, 
that my belief is true, and therefore that none of the skeptical hypotheses is the case. 
Not only must the skeptical hypotheses be false, but I must know that they are false, 
in order to know that my belief is true. 
But of course, the problem is that I don’t seem to be able to rule out the existence 
of an evil genius. Perhaps nothing indicates that it exists, but nothing indicates either 
that it cannot exist. I may consider the suggestion that there is an evil genius strange, 
but I’m not able to determine that it is false. Crispin Wright, who formulates the 
argument using the dream hypothesis, says that what supports the second skeptical 
premise is the fact that “I cannot acquire sufficient reason to believe that I am not 
dreaming at t by any empirical procedure” (Wright, 1986, p. 55). That is, there is 
nothing that is given in my present experience that excludes the possibility that it is 
part of a dream, or that it is the creation of an evil genius. All my current experience 
is compatible with the experience I would have if everything has been created by an 
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evil genius. Therefore, nothing that is given in my experience is sufficient to deter-
mine whether or not there is an evil genius. So I seem to have no choice but to accept 
the second premise of the argument, according to which I don’t know that there is 
not an evil genius. And if I do not know that the skeptical scenarios are false, I have 
no knowledge of Moorean propositions such as “I have hands”. 
Still, the conclusion of the argument seems unacceptable. After all, before con-
sidering the skeptical scenarios, we accept the Moorean propositions as obviously 
true, as objects of certain knowledge. But once we recognize that some of the skep-
tical hypotheses may be true, and hence that there may be no external world, it 
seems necessary to conclude that we don’t have knowledge of these propositions. If 
we accept that we must know the skeptical hypotheses to be false in order to have 
knowledge of Moorean propositions, and that in fact we do not know that they are 
false, we are forced to accept the skeptical conclusion that our beliefs about the 
external world do not amount to knowledge. While this conclusion may be contrary 
to our intuitions about knowledge, it appears necessary if we accept the plausible 
skeptical premises. 
Several authors, such as Stroud, Wright and Pritchard, propose that we should 
take the skeptical problem to be an intellectual challenge of this kind. This has im-
plications for how we should not regard the skeptical problem. Unlike what the 
common expression “skeptical doubt” suggests, we should not take skepticism to be 
a doctrine that requires its followers to doubt Moorean propositions in everyday life 
or to behave in a bizarre way. Descartes himself acknowledges that “no sane person 
has ever seriously doubted these things [that there really is a world, that human 
beings have bodies and so on]” (Descartes, 1641/1986, p. 11). The skeptical conclu-
sion, according to Stroud, is that “we can know nothing of how it [the world around 
us] is, no matter what convictions, beliefs, or opinions we continue, perhaps inevi-
tably, to hold about it” (Stroud, 1984, p. 32, my emphasis). So we should not con-
ceive the skeptic as someone who must be persuaded that he knows Moorean prop-
ositions. As Wright says, “there are no real such opponents. That generations of 
philosophers have felt impelled to grapple with skeptical arguments is not attribut-
able to a courtesy due to an historically distinguished sponsorship but to the fact 
that these arguments are paradoxes: seemingly valid derivations from seemingly well 
supported premises of utterly unacceptable consequences” (Wright, 1991, p. 89). 
Finally, in the same spirit, Pritchard says that “the sceptic is, properly understood, 
not an adversary at all, but simply our intellectual conscience who is highlighting 
the inconsistency of our beliefs about knowledge” (Pritchard, 2005, p. 192). 
In short, for the skeptical argument to be valid, it is not necessary to assume that 
we should no longer believe in Moorean propositions. If it requires us to doubt 
anything, it is the epistemic status of our beliefs in these propositions. It also does 
not ask us, as noted by Stroud (cf. 1984, p. 66), to change the way we ordinarily 
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claim to know things. We need not start claiming not to know things we used to 
claim to know before, as we need not start taking the skeptical hypotheses into 
consideration in everyday contexts. The argument need not provoke a change in 
our linguistic practices. From an everyday point of view, everything remains the 
same. What we realize after considering the skeptical argument is that a plausible 
requirement, viz. that in order to know something we need to be able to rule out 
the situations that would falsify it, together with the considerations that skeptical 
hypotheses falsify Moorean propositions and that we do not know them to be false, 
lead us to the paradoxical conclusion that in fact we do not know all the things we 
ordinarily take ourselves to know. 
2. Wittgenstein against skepticism: weak criticisms  
With this characterization of skepticism in mind, I will take it that any strong attack 
against the skeptical argument should be directed either against one of its premises, 
or against something they presuppose. On Certainty is a particularly difficult book 
to interpret, because it is basically a set of unrevised notes published posthumously. 
I will try to show that it is reasonable to classify some of Wittgenstein’s criticisms 
against skepticism in two broad types: the weak and the strong ones.5 In this part 
of the paper, I intend to show that two criticisms that Wittgenstein formulates 
against skepticism in On Certainty can be regarded as weak, because they do not 
attack any skeptical premise, nor any of its assumptions.6 In the third part of the 
paper, I will discuss some stronger criticisms. 
As I said in the previous section, although skepticism and doubt are concepts 
usually taken to be inseparable, it is possible and desirable to deal with the skeptical 
problem without assuming any doubt that causes a change in our beliefs and actions. 
However, perhaps precisely because of the constant association between skepticism 
and doubt, in several passages of On Certainty, Wittgenstein attacks the doubt pur-
portedly required by the skeptical problem. There are at least two lines of argument 
which attack skepticism in this way: (1) The observation of the absence of skeptical 
doubt and (2) The observation of the practical impossibility of skeptical doubt. 
Let’s deal with number (1) first. In several passages, Wittgenstein draws attention 
to the fact that, when he acts, he acts without having certain doubts. He says that 
                                                   
5 In general, the commentators either focus on Wittgenstein’s stronger observations against skepticism, or 
attribute a stronger force to the criticisms I take to be weak. I believe it is important to deal with both types, 
and highlight their differences, if only to expose what was Wittgenstein’s conception of skepticism and to 
make clear what is wrong with it. I don’t claim my treatment to be exhaustive. Other kinds of responses 
against skepticism can be found in the book (cf. n. 3), but I’m not going to pursue them here. 
6 It is important to note that in On Certainty Wittgenstein has two targets: skepticism and Moore, who took 
himself to have presented a definitive answer to the skeptical problem. Both criticisms appear linked in the 
text, but here I’m going to focus on his criticism of skepticism. 
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he acts with complete certainty (OC, §174), without raising doubts about the exist-
ence of things around him. For instance, he simply acts without “satisfy[ing] myself 
that I have two feet when I want to get up from a chair” (OC, §148). Wittgenstein 
also points out that he doesn’t doubt the existence of external objects, the regularity 
of the events in the world, and the reliability of his memory: 
If I make an experiment I do not doubt the existence of the apparatus before 
my eyes. I have plenty of doubts, but not that. If I do a calculation I believe, 
without any doubts, that the figures on the paper aren’t switching of their 
own accord, and I also trust my memory the whole time, and trust it without 
any reservation (OC, §337). 
His intention seems to be to show the absence of any of the alleged skeptical 
doubts in everyday life. When scientists, for instance, make experiments, they ac-
cept without doubt a number of things, including the existence of the instruments 
being used. If they were to doubt the existence of external objects, the regularity of 
the world and the reliability of their memory, they wouldn’t be able to carry out the 
experiment. But this observation does not affect skepticism. Skeptical doubts on 
these topics are epistemological and not practical. That is, they ask whether we can 
know that there are physical objects, whether we can know that future events will 
occur in accordance with past events, and whether we can know that memory can 
be trusted. These questions needn’t imply any change in our way of acting. For this 
reason, to attack skepticism, it is irrelevant to say that we act without having certain 
doubts. Skepticism is not denying that. 
Another similar observation that Wittgenstein makes is that not only him, but 
any reasonable person believes, for instance, having two hands (OC, §252). The so-
called “reasonable person”, mentioned a few times throughout the text, can be un-
derstood as the opposite of the insane person, who actually doubts Moorean prop-
ositions. He says that “the reasonable man does not have certain doubts” (OC, §220), 
and “any ‘reasonable’ person behaves like this” (OC, §254). That is, Wittgenstein is 
calling our attention to the absence of skeptical doubt in everyday life by normal, 
reasonable people. I will come back to this topic below. For now, suffice to say that 
there is no incompatibility between accepting the skeptical challenge and being a 
reasonable person. In other words, we need not assume that to be consistent, a skep-
tic philosopher should exhibit weird behavior, like checking that his feet remain 
there before getting up. That doubts about Moorean propositions are absent for 
reasonable people does not show that skepticism is false. Again, if there is any doubt 
being suggested by the skeptical argument, it concerns the epistemic status of the 
beliefs on Moorean propositions, and not their degree of subjective certainty. 
Moreover, in several passages, Wittgenstein talks about the fact that we do not 
teach children to doubt Moorean propositions. Again, his goal seems to be to show 
that our practices are not aligned with what is supposedly demanded by skepticism. 
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What we teach children is a reflection of what we adults consider important, and is 
also a reflection of our own behavior. Certain doubts, such as those about the exist-
ence of material objects, are absent and irrelevant in most situations. They just do 
not appear in our practices. Therefore, they are not passed on to future generations. 
He says, for example: 
We teach a child “that is your hand”, not “that is perhaps (or “probably”) 
your hand”. That is how a child learns the innumerable language-games that 
are concerned with his hand. An investigation or question, ‘whether this is 
really a hand’ never occurs to him (OC, §374). When a child learns language 
it learns at the same time what is to be investigated and what not. When it 
learns that there is a cupboard in the room, it isn’t taught to doubt whether 
what it sees later on is still a cupboard or only a kind of stage set (OC, §472). 
Again, Wittgenstein’s intention seems to be to show that the actions observed in 
the world, the way we actually behave, do not support the supposed requirements of 
the skeptical argument, but instead show, in a way, the absurdity of skepticism. It is 
as if, in the spirit of the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein was saying “do not 
think, look”, trying to point out with these observations the discrepancy between 
philosophical reflections and our practice in the world. That’s because, according to 
what Wittgenstein seems to believe, skepticism requires us to have some doubts 
about the existence of external objects that are clearly absent in our lives. 
But again, the skeptical argument does not intend to describe how we act. It 
would only be possible to use the discrepancy between skepticism and practice to 
refute skepticism if it were committed to describing our practices. Wittgenstein’s 
observations on the absence of skeptical doubt in everyday life are correct, but irrel-
evant to skepticism. That is, he is right in saying that we don’t have certain doubts 
in everyday life, that reasonable people believe in Moorean propositions and that 
children are not taught to doubt these propositions. But these observations won’t 
work to undermine skepticism. So Wittgenstein’s remarks on the absence of doubt 
in everyday life do not affect the skeptical argument formulated in the first section. 
But in addition to observing that the skeptical doubt does not appear in practice, 
Wittgenstein also argues that it could not appear. That is, he argues for the practical 
impossibility of skeptical doubts. This is the second sort of weak criticism against 
skepticism I mentioned above. Let’s look at some passages: 
Might I not believe the contrary after all [of the earth having existed long 
before my birthday]? But the question is: What would the practical effects of 
this belief be? (OC, §89). What would it be like to doubt now whether I have 
two hands? Why can’t I imagine it at all? What would I believe if I didn’t 
believe that? So far I have no system at all within which this doubt might exist 
(OC, §247). If I ask someone “what colour do you see at the moment?”, in 
order, that is, to learn what colour is there at the moment, I cannot at the 
same time question whether the person I ask understands English, whether he 
wants to take me in, whether my own memory is not leaving me in the lurch 
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as to the names of colours, and so on (OC, §345). Imagine a language-game 
“When I call you, come in through the door”. In any ordinary case, a doubt 
whether there really is a door there will be impossible (OC, §391). 
One way of reading these passages is taking Wittgenstein as highlighting the 
impossibility of doubting Moorean propositions in everyday life, because of the un-
acceptable consequences, and impossible demands, that these doubts would have if 
they were exercised in everyday life.7 That is, he seems to conclude that skeptical 
doubt is impossible because, if exercised in practice, it would have devastating ef-
fects. If I doubted the existence of my hands, I wouldn’t know what to believe an-
ymore. If I decided to question everything, not excluding anything from the scope 
of doubt, I would no longer be able to carry on simple conversations, because I 
would have to doubt the meanings of the words I uttered. If I were always in doubt 
about the existence of external objects, I would not be able to perform common 
everyday tasks, like opening a door, or playing a game of chess (cf. OC, §346). 
In short, everyday tasks would be impractical. In fact, one could not survive. We 
need to accept certain things without doubt in order to be able to act in everyday 
life. Hence the practical impossibility of skeptical doubt. 
Several commentators seem to think that Wittgenstein shows the absurdity of 
skepticism because he makes explicit its practical impossibility. Stroll, for instance, 
thinks that the skeptic who doubted everything would be someone whose behavior 
is senseless: 
Wittgenstein’s sceptic is an individual who raises doubts that the average per-
son would never conceive of. […] His worries are obsessive and non-termi-
nating. […] All of us grow up in a community and our behaviour is deter-
mined to be sensible or not by its conformity to the rules of such an assem-
blage. The obsessive sceptic is not behaving according to such procedures; and 
this is why his behaviour is senseless (Stroll, 2005, p. 45). 
Wright, although not accepting Stroll’s naive view of an obsessive skeptic, seems 
to endorse Wittgenstein’s idea that skeptical doubt would be impossible in everyday 
life because it is not clear what it would be like to adopt it. According to him, 
It is seriously unclear what it could be to suspend these beliefs, or hold others 
contrary to them. What might be the scheme of beliefs and goals of a rational 
subject who doubted the existence of matter? How, from a viewpoint within 
our scheme, might he be expected to behave? (Wright, 1986, p. 90). 
So in a stronger way of reading these passages, Wittgenstein would be saying not 
(just) that changing our beliefs would have devastating practical consequences, but 
                                                   
7 Some interpreters might prefer to read these passages not as merely pragmatic responses, but as part of Witt-
genstein’s logical objections against skepticism. I place them here because, in my reading, they are not as 
strong as the logical criticisms I will consider in part 3, but also because I think they seem to assume that 
adopting skepticism would require some practical changes, and the formation of new beliefs. 
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that it’s actually impossible to change our beliefs at will, because having skeptical 
doubts would require a new belief system, which we don’t have at our disposal. But 
still, this seems to presuppose a view of skepticism not as a paradoxical intellectual 
challenge, but to some degree a practical challenge that would demand the revision 
of our belief system. Wright’s passage is curious because, in the same paper, he sup-
ports precisely the idea argued for in the first section of this paper, that the skeptical 
problem should be seen as a paradox. But if skepticism is seen as a paradox, it is 
irrelevant to consider which other beliefs we would adopt if we were to abandon 
ours. The skeptical argument does not ask us to abandon our belief system and form 
a new one. We are not required to believe that there is no external world, and adapt 
our other beliefs accordingly. Even if it’s true that we are forced to stick to our belief 
system, because we have no other rational alternative, and no idea how to form a 
new one, that doesn’t mean it cannot be intellectually challenged. From a skeptical 
point of view, it is then irrelevant that it is supposedly impossible to doubt Moorean 
propositions in everyday life, either because these doubts would have devastating 
consequences, or because they would require us to formulate a new belief system, 
which is supposedly impossible. 
In other passages, Wittgenstein suggests another reason for the impossibility of 
the skeptical doubt in everyday life, related to the one concerning the absence of 
skeptical doubts by reasonable people. He also says      that reasonable people cannot 
have certain doubts: 
Can I believe for one moment that I have ever been in the stratosphere? No. 
[…] There cannot be any doubt about it for me as a reasonable person (OC, 
§§218-219). I cannot at present imagine a reasonable doubt as to the existence 
of the earth during the last 100 years (OC, §261). 
What the above comments suggest is that skeptical doubt is impossible for a rea-
sonable person. That seems to be, in a way, a conceptual observation. If you are a 
reasonable person, you cannot have certain doubts, because being reasonable in-
volves not having certain doubts (cf. §220, §252, §254). Similarly, a reasonable doubt 
about the existence of material objects, for example, is impossible, because a doubt 
of this type in ordinary life would be unreasonable. Anyone who actually ceased to 
believe Moorean propositions such as “I am a human being” would certainly not be 
considered reasonable. Wittgenstein suggests that this behavior would be a sign of 
madness or mental disturbance, not of a mistake or doubt. According to him, 
If my friend were to imagine one day that he had been living for a long time 
past in such and such a place, etc. etc., I should not call this a mistake, but rather 
a mental disturbance, perhaps a transient one (OC, §71) If Moore were to pro-
nounce the opposite of those propositions which he declares certain, we should 
not just not share his opinion: we should regard him as demented (OC, §155). 
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According to Wittgenstein, the difference between a mistake and a mental dis-
turbance, or the difference there is between treating something as a mistake or as a 
mental disturbance (OC, §73) would be that, unlike the case of mental disturbance, 
when someone makes a mistake, it is possible to understand where it comes from, 
given what the person already knows (OC, §74). Also, when someone makes a mis-
take and says something false, it is possible to show why it was a mistake and how 
her claim is incompatible with the rest of our beliefs. As Wittgenstein says, “in order 
to make a mistake, a man must already judge in conformity with mankind” (OC, 
§156). But if someone says with conviction something like “the planet Earth does 
not exist”, contradicting something that we all believe, according to Wittgenstein, 
we would not treat this as a mistake, nor call it such, because apparently that person 
does not share with us the background necessary to understand what we understand. 
In cases like this, I would not know what to say to this person to convince her that 
what she says is not correct, and so the natural reaction would be consider her men-
tally disturbed. Similarly, if someone were to doubt Moorean propositions in eve-
ryday life, we would not call this a behavior of doubt. What we normally call 
“doubt” can at least in principle be solved (cf. OC, §3). But apparently nothing could 
be said to solve the doubts of someone who were not certain of the existence of her 
hands, looking at them from all angles with an investigative air. Therefore, it would 
be more appropriate to call this a mental disturbance than a doubt (OC, §154, §255). 
This criticism of Wittgenstein involves an observation on how the words “mis-
take” and “doubt” are used in ordinary life. Against a skeptic who says that we can 
be mistaken about Moorean propositions, or that we can doubt them, Wittgenstein 
says that this is impossible because no mistake or doubt of this kind can appear in 
practice; if it were to appear, it would not be called a “mistake” or a “doubt”, but a 
sign of madness. But none of this is incompatible with the skeptical argument, as I 
have set it out. Indeed, a skeptical philosopher can fully agree with Wittgenstein 
and accept that there cannot be a reasonable doubt in practice about the existence 
of external objects. He can also accept that someone who actually believed the ne-
gation of Moorean propositions would be described as crazy, and her behavior 
would not be called a behavior of “doubting”, or a “mistake”. The observation that 
if I were to manifest doubt about the existence of my hands in practice I would not 
be considered a reasonable person and my behavior would not be legitimately called 
a behavior of doubting doesn’t affect skepticism. What the conclusion of the skep-
tical argument says is that, because of my ignorance of the falsity of the skeptical 
scenarios, I don’t really know Moorean propositions. Again, the conclusion of the 
argument does not say that I should doubt Moorean propositions in everyday life. 
It also does not say that I should call “reasonable doubt” the behavior of someone 
who actually doubted Moorean propositions. The argument assumes that I can be 
mistaken about Moorean propositions, but it doesn’t say that I should start acting 
Raquel Krempel   Why Wittgenstein Doesn’t Refute Skepticism 
 
244 
as if I were. So none of these observations about how we would or would not label 
the behavior of someone who, as it were, lived his skepticism, really affects the skep-
tical argument. Skepticism, as formulated in the first section, is not supposed to be 
lived. It requires only the acceptance that we can be mistaken about Moorean prop-
ositions, and therefore that we do not know them. And to refute that, it won’t do 
to say that the manifestation of reasonable doubt or of a mistake about Moorean 
propositions is practically impossible. 
Thus, Wittgenstein’s remarks considered so far do not attack the intellectual 
challenge posed by the skeptical problem presented in the first section. They show 
no error either in the premises of the argument or in any of its assumptions. How-
ever, some parts of On Certainty can be interpreted as going against what may be 
considered assumptions of the argument. In the next section, I will deal with criti-
cisms of this type. My aim is to show that even these are not strong enough to refute 
skepticism, because they still assume that skepticism is a challenge to our practices 
(in this case, epistemic practices). 
3. Strong criticisms 
The premises of the skeptical argument seem to assume that we can be mistaken 
about Moorean propositions and that it is possible to doubt them at least from a 
philosophical or theoretical point of view, in the sense that we can question whether 
we really know that they are true. They also seem to assume that Moorean propo-
sitions have a truth-value, that is, that they are either true or false. The idea is that 
if some skeptical hypothesis is the case, Moorean propositions are false. If they are 
not, and the world really is like we think it is, then these propositions are true. 
Certain remarks of Wittgenstein can be read as counterpoints to these ideas, and 
can therefore be taken as stronger observations against skepticism. As I intend to 
show below, Wittgenstein denies the logical possibility of doubt and of us being 
mistaken about Moorean propositions, and probably for this reason, he also denies 
that they have truth-value.8 
In the previous section, I presented one of Wittgenstein’s arguments against skep-
ticism that I consider weak, regarding the practical impossibility of mistake or doubt 
                                                   
8 Another anti-skeptical strategy Wittgenstein takes in On Certainty, which is probably the most discussed in 
the literature, concerns his denial that Moorean propositions can be objects of knowledge. According to him, 
for a proposition to be knowable, it must be possible to justify it with something more certain than it (cf. OC, 
§1, §243, §250, §307). Moorean propositions, however, are not justifiable by anything more certain than 
them, because they are already what is more certain. Therefore, knowledge would not be a category that 
applies to them. They would be simply groundless. We couldn’t either claim to know them, like Moore, or 
claim not to know them, like the skeptic. Against this idea, I agree with Pritchard (2005). I don’t see why the 
observation that they cannot be justified should lead to the conclusion that knowledge doesn’t apply to them, 
and not to the very skeptical idea that, precisely because we cannot justify them, we cannot know them. In 
short, it seems to me an arbitrary way out of skepticism to stipulate that knowledge is not a category that can 
be applied to Moorean propositions, instead of saying that we lack knowledge of them. But I won’t deal with 
this objection against skepticism in this paper, since I want to focus on some less discussed ones. 
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about Moorean propositions. But Wittgenstein develops in On Certainty another 
kind of argument against skepticism, which is stronger because it says that the mis-
take or doubt about Moore’s propositions must be logically excluded (cf. OC, §51, 
§155, §194, §454).9 So Moore’s propositions cannot be subject to skeptical doubt, not 
only because this doubt would have unacceptable practical consequences, or because 
it would require us to revise our belief system, but also because, in order for there to 
be what we ordinarily call doubt, it is necessary for certain propositions to be exempt 
from doubt (cf. OC, §88, §341, §450, §625). Similarly, in order for someone to make 
a mistake, there must be propositions about which one cannot be mistaken. Mistakes 
and doubts only exist, according to Wittgenstein, because there are propositions that 
we cannot doubt and about which we cannot be mistaken. Wittgenstein’s idea is 
that these propositions form the background that guarantees the possibility of our 
language games, including those of doubt and of mistake. That is, in order for our 
claims of doubt and admissions or attributions of a mistake to exist and be meaning-
ful, there must be certain propositions which are not themselves doubted and about 
which we cannot be mistaken. The idea that Moore’s propositions cannot be subject 
to doubt, and that we cannot be mistaken about them, leads Wittgenstein to assign 
them a special logical role (cf. OC, §136), calling them logical or grammatical propo-
sitions. According to him, “my convictions do form a system, a structure” (OC, 
§102), which is characterized, among other things, by not being doubted and, above 
all, by being beyond the possibility of falsification. 
The distinction between empirical propositions and logical or grammatical prop-
ositions (also called “hinge propositions” in the literature) is one of the central 
themes of On Certainty. Empirical propositions, as their name suggests, can have 
their truth-value discovered after empirical verification. Grammatical propositions, 
on the contrary, function like rules of a game (cf. OC, §95, §494), which are neither 
true nor false. Just like rules that tell us what we need to accept before we can play 
a game, they describe what needs to be accepted so that there can be language games. 
Another distinction that Wittgenstein makes is between a hypothesis and a world-
picture (OC, §167). A hypothesis (as an empirical proposition) is something that can 
be tested and then proven true or false. A world-picture, however, is the condition 
for us to judge something as true or false. It is not itself tested or questioned. My 
world-picture, as Wittgenstein says, “is the inherited background against which I 
distinguish between true and false” (OC, §94). Wittgenstein seems to think that the 
world-picture itself is neither true nor false: “I have a world-picture. Is it true or 
false? Above all it is the substratum of all my enquiring and asserting” (§162). 
                                                   
9 Other commentators insist that Wittgenstein’s point against the possibility of skeptical doubt is logical, such 
as Wright (1991, p. 104) and Williams (1991, p. 14). I agree that this is a central aspect of Wittgenstein’s anti-
skeptical strategy but, as I tried to show in the previous section, it is not the only one. Besides, I believe their 
approach don’t take into consideration the problems that I’m going to raise against this allegedly logical 
attack against skepticism. 
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Also, “if the true is what is grounded, then the ground is not true, nor yet false” 
(§205). The propositions describing this world-picture, which are precisely the 
Moorean propositions, would also be neither true nor false, since the very world-
picture they describe is not true or false.10 
Wittgenstein’s idea that Moorean propositions are grammatical propositions 
that are neither true nor false is original because, at first glance, propositions like “I 
have two hands” or “I have never been in another galaxy”, seem to be empirical. 
This is because they have the same form of other propositions that are in fact em-
pirical, such as “I have two cats” or “I have never been to Argentina”, which can be 
verified or tested, and which are informative and can be true or false. But, as Witt-
genstein observes, “not everything that has the form of an empirical proposition is 
one” (OC, §308). Grammatical or logical propositions, as their name suggests, reflect 
the grammar or logic of our language, the rules that underlie our linguistic uses, 
which must be accepted for language games to be possible. So contrary to appear-
ances, they are not indubitable truths, because according to Wittgenstein they don’t 
really have a truth-value. 
Again, Wittgenstein’s argument points to the alleged special logical role played 
by Moorean propositions within the grammar of our language. Moorean proposi-
tions must be exempt from doubt so that doubt can exist, since “doubt itself rests 
only on what is beyond doubt” (OC, §519). But they also, more generally, must be 
out of the scope of doubt in order for thinking, judging, questioning, and any other 
language game to be possible: 
About certain empirical propositions no doubt can exist if making judgments 
is to be possible at all (OC, §308). The questions that we raise and our doubts 
depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it 
were like hinges on which those turn (OC, §341). It belongs to the logic of our 
scientific investigations that certain things are in deed not doubted (OC, §342). 
Certain propositions seem to underlie all questions and all thinking (OC, 
§415). So is this it: I must recognize certain authorities in order to make judge-
ments at all? (OC, §493). A language-game is only possible if one trusts some-
thing (OC, §509). 
But besides having a system of propositions that is beyond doubt, for us to be 
able to think, to judge something as true or false, to ask questions, to claim to know 
or to doubt something, etc., the propositions that form that system must also not 
be falsifiable. Note that it is not only that people should accept a system of Moorean 
                                                   
10 In some initial paragraphs, Wittgenstein seems to accept that Moorean propositions are true. He says, for 
example, that “the truth of certain empirical propositions belongs to our frame of reference” (OC, §83). 
However, the prevailing idea in the text is that they are neither true nor false. The best way to interpret §83 
seems to be that we can call them “true” if we like, but only in a diluted sense of “true”, meaning only that 
they are the unmoving foundation of our language games (OC, §403). So they are not to be taken as true in 
the usual sense, as corresponding to how the world is (OC, §191, §199).  
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propositions as if they could not be false, so that they can think, judge, etc. Witt-
genstein’s idea seems to be that these propositions cannot in fact be false. Besides 
saying, as we’ve seen, that Moorean propositions describe our world picture, which 
is neither true nor false, Wittgenstein says things like: 
Are a lot of our statements incapable of falsehood? For that is what we want 
to say (OC, §436). I am inclined to say: “That cannot be false.” That is inter-
esting; but what consequences has it? (OC, §437). This statement [“That’s a 
house”] appeared to me fundamental; if it is false, what are ‘true’ or ‘false’ any 
more?! (OC, §514). If my name is not L. W., how can I rely on what is meant 
by “true” and “false”? (OC, §515). 
So Moore’s propositions cannot be false because, if they were false, we would not 
know, for instance, how to assign truth or falsity to empirical propositions. We 
would not be able to judge things as true or false, in part because the meanings of 
“true” and “false” would cease to be clear. That would presumably damage our ca-
pacity to think and judge. 
So my world-picture is something that needs to be accepted without doubt be-
cause otherwise thinking wouldn’t be possible. It is neither true nor false, because 
it is the substrate against which we distinguish between true and false (OC, §94, 
§162). And, more strongly, Moorean propositions cannot be false, because if they 
were false, the meanings of “true” and “false” would be unclear. “True” and “false” 
mean what they do in part because certain things cannot be false. 
The fact that we think, judge, etc., shows that there are propositions that have 
to be accepted, and Wittgenstein claims that these propositions must be unfalsifia-
ble (and unverifiable, since they are also the basis for the game of verification to 
work). In short, Moore’s propositions function as objective certainties11 that have 
no truth-value, and as such they cannot be false, for they guarantee the very meaning 
and possibility of assigning truth or falsity to other propositions. 
We can thus infer from what’s been said that Wittgenstein would consider false 
the skeptical assumption according to which Moorean propositions may be false. 
According to him, taking into account our belief system, and precisely to ensure its 
validity, we should admit that propositions such as Moore’s are neither true nor 
false. Also, we presumably cannot doubt or be mistaken about something that is 
neither true nor false. Thus, he would also take to be false skeptical assumptions 
that we can be mistaken about Moorean propositions and that we can at least in 
principle doubt our knowledge of them. Wittgenstein seems to think that the fact 
that there are all sorts of language games shows that some propositions must be 
beyond the scope of doubt. Once we grant that these propositions are logically be-
yond doubt and mistake, that they are the foundation for thought, and that they in 
                                                   
11 As opposed to subjective certainties. According to Wittgenstein, objective certainties play a special logical 
role, whereas “subjective certainties” refers to the psychological state of certainty (cf. OC, §194). 
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fact are like rules that have no truth-value, we can accept that Wittgenstein offers a 
way out of the skeptical problem. “There is an external world” is no longer a prop-
osition that could be subject to doubt, and we cannot be mistaken about it either, 
since it has no truth-value, and cannot be false. Once it is shown that these skeptical 
assumptions are false, we no longer need to worry about the possible nonexistence 
of the external world, as suggested by skepticism. 
The problem is that Wittgenstein does not really show that these skeptical as-
sumptions are false. In his argument, he assumes that in order for thinking, judging, 
etc., to exist, there must be propositions that are logically exempted from doubt. 
He also assumes that these propositions must be in fact neither true nor false. Since 
we think and judge, there are propositions that must not be doubted, and since 
these propositions only describe the background against which we think, doubt, 
judge something true or false, etc. (let’s call all these “epistemic practices”), they 
have no truth-value and cannot be false. And if so, presumably no skeptical scenario 
can be the case, because if it were, Moorean propositions would have a truth-value: 
they would be false. But it is not really clear either that Moorean propositions must 
have no truth-value, or that they must be logically exempt from mistake and doubt, 
for there to be epistemic practices. 
Even if it is true that Moorean propositions must be exempt from doubt for us 
to be able to think and judge, it is not clear they should in fact have no truth-value, 
for us to be able to judge other propositions to be true or false. Nor is it clear that 
they should be incapable of being false in order for “true” and “false” to preserve 
their meaning. That is, it is not clear that for our epistemic practices to work, 
Moorean propositions must be incapable of falsehood. Skepticism seems to show 
precisely that this is not a legitimate requirement. Skeptical scenarios such as the 
evil genius show that these propositions can be false with almost everything remain-
ing the same, without any change being necessary in the way we think and judge in 
everyday life. It is precisely for this reason that our experience does not allow us to 
decide whether or not there is an evil genius: it is compatible with both scenarios. 
Everything remains as it is for me, even if there is an evil genius and everything I 
believe is false. Also, there is no need to assume, with Wittgenstein, that the mean-
ings of “true” and “false” would be unclear in case everything we believe to be true 
is in fact false. We would just be wrong about the truth-value we believe our most 
basic beliefs to have (that there is an external world and so on). In case we learned 
that we are in fact in a skeptical scenario, there would be no need to assume a change 
in the meanings of “true” and “false”; though there would probably be a change in 
which propositions we take to be true and which we take to be false. That is, we 
might wish to revise our attribution of truth and falsity to propositions, if we wanted 
to be consistent with our knowledge that we are in a skeptical scenario. But it is 
unclear why Wittgenstein assumes that the meanings of “true” and “false” would 
change. And even assuming with Wittgenstein that the meanings of “true” and “     
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false” would have to be revised if Moorean propositions were false, that still doesn’t 
show that Moorean propositions don’t have a truth-value. The most it shows is that 
we might have to reexamine the meanings of some words. 
As I understand skepticism, it does not simply assume that Moorean proposi-
tions can be false. It shows this, by presenting possible scenarios that would make 
these propositions false. It is Wittgenstein who seems to stipulate, not to show, that 
they cannot be false, on the assumption that epistemic practices could not exist, or 
would have to be revised, if they were false. That is, Wittgenstein does not show 
that it is really necessary for these propositions to have no truth-value for our prac-
tices of thinking, judging, doubting, etc. to work. And skepticism seems to show 
precisely that this is not the case, that our epistemic practices could be just like they 
are if there were no external world. 
So skepticism shows that Wittgenstein’s requirement that Moorean propositions 
need to have no truth-value is ill advised. But also ill advised is Wittgenstein’s idea 
that these propositions must logically be exempt from doubt and mistake for there 
to be thinking and judging. For in philosophical contexts, situations in which we 
consider the skeptical argument, we can doubt whether we know the truth-value of 
Moorean propositions, precisely because we recognize that there are certain scenar-
ios that would make them false. We can then accept that they can be false and that 
we can be mistaken about them, without being unable to think or judge. Someone 
who considers the skeptical argument and agrees that our knowledge about 
Moorean propositions can be doubted is actually thinking, thinking that the argu-
ment is valid, that its conclusion may be true, etc. And if, when I do philosophy, 
I can conceive possible scenarios which, if true, would make me be mistaken about 
Moorean propositions, with everything remaining the same, then it is not really 
logically necessary, in the usual sense of the word, that certain propositions are be-
yond doubt or mistake. Intellectual chaos is not a necessary consequence of doubts 
or mistakes about our knowledge of the truth-value of Moorean propositions. In 
the end, Wittgenstein seems to be simply stipulating that Moorean propositions 
must be logically beyond the scope of mistake and doubt, for skepticism shows us 
precisely the opposite. 
The most that Wittgenstein can say is something much weaker than he probably 
originally intended, that is, that in ordinary situations Moorean propositions must be 
accepted without doubt, as if they could not be false, so one can keep up with the 
everyday epistemic practices of making judgments, claiming to know things, doubt-
ing or justifying something, asking a question, etc. That is, when Wittgenstein says 
that Moorean propositions must logically be exempt from doubt, the most we can 
make of it is that, for ordinary epistemic practices to be possible, they must normally 
be taken for granted, accepted without doubt. Similarly, when he says that they can-
not be false, the most we can make of it is that they need, in everyday life, to be 
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accepted as if they could not be false, for our epistemic practices to work. Wittgenstein 
can say that it is part of the logic, or of the way our everyday epistemic practices work, 
that they rely on a system of propositions that is accepted as being both beyond doubt 
and as unfalsifiable. But that seems to be just a description of how the epistemic prac-
tices usually work in ordinary situations. The philosophical questioning of Moorean 
propositions just shows that there is no real logical necessity in their acceptance with-
out doubt, and that we can be mistaken about them, since they can be false. There-
fore, the logical impossibility of doubt, or of falsehood of these propositions that 
Wittgenstein talks about, can at most be a disguised practical impossibility. 
Thus, Wittgenstein shows neither that it is necessary that these propositions have 
no truth-value, nor that they are logically exempt from doubt and mistake. 
He shows at most that, in everyday life, to be able to proceed with our epistemic 
practices, we must accept certain propositions without doubt, as if they could not 
be false, even if in fact they can be false and can be doubted in philosophical reflec-
tions. But that is not at odds with skepticism. The skeptic doesn’t doubt Moorean 
propositions per se. He doesn’t doubt that he has hands, he doubts that he has 
knowledge about the existence of his hands. That doubt is unchallenged by Witt-
genstein’s observations. And, as stated earlier, the acceptance of the validity of the 
skeptical argument need not imply a change in our practices, even epistemic ones. 
As Stroud notes, skepticism implies the lack of knowledge of Moorean propositions, 
but not a change, for example, in the way we ordinarily claim to know things, or 
doubt things, or judge, etc. Knowledge possession and epistemic-linguistic practices 
are different things. When we consider the skeptical hypotheses, we realize that our 
knowledge of Moorean propositions may be doubted and that they may be false, 
and if we accept the argument we conclude that we don’t really know these propo-
sitions. But we can keep our everyday epistemic practices intact. 
Wittgenstein’s remarks are certainly interesting and can help us better under-
stand our everyday epistemic practices. But they are not enough to undermine the 
intellectual challenge that skepticism presents us. Wittgenstein does not refute what 
I initially said could be called skeptical assumptions, that is, the ideas that Moorean 
propositions can be false, and that we can be mistaken about them and doubt them 
on a theoretical level. We may have to accept, in everyday life, that Moorean prop-
ositions cannot be false, and it’s possible that we ordinarily have to accept them 
without doubt, otherwise our epistemic practices could not work. But skepticism 
shows us that these propositions can in principle be doubted, and that we can be 
mistaken about them, since they can be false. It is possible that they are false, be-
cause it is possible that some skeptical scenario is the case. If the world is indeed as 
I believe it is, if all skeptical hypotheses are false, these propositions are true. In any 
case, they have a truth-value. As I argued, Wittgenstein is not successful in showing 
that our epistemic practices prevent the falsity of Moorean propositions. If Moorean 
propositions have truth-value, it seems reasonable to say that we either know that 
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they are true, or we don’t. And if they can in principle be known, but we, because 
of the skeptical hypotheses, don’t know their truth-value, then we do not know 
them. They will continue to be unknown until we know that the skeptical hypoth-
eses are false. And so we return to skepticism. The stipulation that certain proposi-
tions cannot be doubted and that they don’t have truth-value appears to be an ad 
hoc way out of skepticism, which is more like a refusal of the skeptical challenge 
than a refutation of it. 
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